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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, a key generation and certification technique using multilayer perceptron (KGCMLP) has 
been proposed in wireless communication of data/information. In this proposed KGCMLP technique both 
sender and receiver uses an identical multilayer perceptrons. Both perceptrons are start synchronization by 
exchanging some control frames. During synchronization process message integrity test and 
synchronization test has been carried out. Only the synchronization test does not guarantee the security for 
this reason key certification phase also been introduced in KGCMLP technique. After Key generation and 
certification procedure synchronized identical weight vector forms the key for encryption/decryption.    
Parametric tests have been done and results are compared with some existing classical techniques, which 
show comparable results for the proposed technique.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Key generation and certification is the most significant issue in cryptographic technique. In recent 
times wide ranges of techniques are developed to protect data and information from 
eavesdroppers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. These algorithms have their virtue and shortcomings. For 
Example in DES, AES algorithms [1] the cipher block length is nonflexible. In NSKTE [4], 
NWSKE [5], AGKNE [6], ANNRPMS [7] and ANNRBLC [8] technique uses two neural 
network one for sender and another for receiver having one hidden layer for producing 
synchronized weight vector for key generation. Now attacker can get an idea about sender and 
receiver’s neural machine because for each session architecture of neural machine is static. In 
NNSKECC algorithm [9] any intermediate blocks throughout its cycle taken as the encrypted 
block and this number of iterations acts as secret key. Here if n number of iterations are needed 
for cycle formation and if intermediate block is chosen as an encrypted block after n/2th iteration 
then exactly same number of iterations i.e. n/2  are needed for decode the block which makes  
easier the attackers life.  In this paper KGCMLP technique has been proposed to manage the key 
generation procedure by synchronizing two multilayer perceptrons and also performs 
authentication procedure and certified both sender and receiver before communication of actual 
data. 
International Journal of Security, Privacy and Trust Management ( IJSPTM), Vol. 1, No 5, October 2012 
 
28 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 of the paper deals with structure of 
multilayer  perceptron. Proposed key generation and certification technique in KGCMLP has 
been discussed in section 3. Complexity analysis of the technique is given in section 4.   
Experimental results are described in section 5. Analysis of the results presented in section 6. 
Analysis regarding various aspects of the technique has been presented in section 7. Conclusions 
and future scope are drawn in section 8 and that of references at end.  
 
2. STRUCTURE OF MULTILAYER PERCEPTRON   
 
In multilayer perceptron synchronization scheme secret session key is not physically get 
exchanged over public insecure channel. At end of neural weight synchronization strategy of both 
parties’ generates identical weight vectors and activated hidden layer outputs for both the parties 
become identical. This identical output of hidden layer for both parties can be use as one time 
secret session key for secured data exchange. A multilayer perceptron synaptic simulated weight 
based undisclosed key generation is carried out between recipient and sender. Figure1 shows 
multilayer perceptron based synaptic simulation system. Sender and receivers multilayer 
perceptron select same single hidden layer among multiple hidden layers for a particular session. 
For that session all other hidden layers goes in deactivated mode means hidden (processing) units 
of other layers do nothing with the incoming input. Either synchronized identical weight vector of 
sender and receivers’ input layer, activated hidden layer and output layer becomes session key or 
session key can be form using identical output of hidden units of activated hidden layer. The key 
generation technique and analysis of the technique using random number of nodes (neurons) and 
the corresponding algorithm is discussed in the subsections 2.1 to 2.5 in details. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A Multilayer Perceptron with 3 Hidden Layers 
 
Sender and receiver multilayer perceptron in each session acts as a single layer network with 
dynamically chosen one activated hidden layer and K no. of hidden neurons, N no. of input 
neurons having binary input vector, { }1,1 +−∈ijx , discrete weights, are generated from input to 
output, are lies between -L and +L, { }LLLwij ++−−∈ ,...,1, .Where i = 1,…,K denotes the ith   hidden unit 
of the perceptron and j = 1,…,N the elements of the vector and one output neuron. Output of the 
hidden units is calculated by the weighted sum over the current input values . So, the state of the 
each hidden neurons is expressed using (eq.1)  
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Output of the ith hidden unit is defined as  
 
                                                              )sgn( ii h=σ              (2) 
                                                                                                                                                     
But in case of ih = 0 then iσ = -1 to produce a binary output. Hence a, iσ = +1, if the weighted 
sum over its inputs is positive, or else it is inactive, iσ = -1. The total output of a perceptron is the 
product of the hidden units expressed in (eq. 2)  
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The learning mechanism proceeds as follows ([6, 7]): 
 
1. If the output bits are different,  ≠ , nothing is changed.  
 
2. 2. If  =  = , only the weights of the hidden units with BABAk
// τσ =
 will be updated. 
 
3. The weight vector of this hidden unit is adjusted using any of the following learning rules: 
 
Anti-Hebbian:  
 
         
))(( //// BABAkkBABAkBAk xWW τττστ Θ−=
                                                         
(4)  
 
Hebbian; 
 
         
))(( //// BABAkkBABAkBAk xWW τττστ Θ+=
                                                           
(5)  
 
Random walk 
 
         
))(( /// BABAkkBAkBAk xWW τττσΘ+=
                                                                    
(6) 
  
During step (2), if there is at least one common hidden unit with  =  in the two networks, then 
there are 3 possibilities that characterize the behaviour of the hidden nodes: 
 
1. An attractive move: if hidden units at similar  positions have equal output bits,       
 
BAB
k
A
k
/τσσ ==
 
2. A repulsive move: if hidden units at similar  positions have unequal output bits, Bk
A
k σσ ≠  
3. No move: when BABk
A
k
/τσσ ≠=
 
 
The distance between hidden units can be defined by their mutual overlap, ,  
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where 0 < < 1, with  = 0 at the start of learning and 
 
= 1 when synchronization occurs with 
the two hidden units having a common weight vector. 
 
2.1 Multilayer Perceptron Simulation Algorithm  
 
Input: - Random weights, input vectors for both multilayer perceptrons. 
 
Output: - Secret key through synchronization of input and output neurons as vectors.  
       
Method:- 
 
Step 1. Initialization of random weight values of synaptic links between input layer and 
randomly selected activated hidden layer. 
 
                            Where, { }LLLwij ++−−∈ ,...,1,                                                             (8) 
 
Step 2.   Repeat step 3 to 6 until the full synchronization is achieved, using                         
Hebbian-learning rules. 
 
                                          ( ) ( )( )BAijiji xwgw ji τττστ ΘΘ+=+ ,,,                                         (9) 
 
Step 3. Generate random input vector X. Inputs are generated by a third party or one of the 
communicating parties.   
 
Step 4. Compute the values of the activated hidden neurons of activated hidden layer using 
(eq. 10)  
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Step 5. Compute the value of the output neuron using    
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Compare the output values of both multilayer perceptron by exchanging the system 
outputs.  
 
if Output (A) ≠ Output (B), Go to step 3  
 else if Output (A) = Output (B) then one of the suitable learning rule is applied  
only the hidden units are trained which have an output bit identical to the common 
output. 
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Hebbian learning 
anti-Hebbian learning  
Random walk learning 
Update the weights only if the final output values of the perceptron are equivalent. When 
synchronization is finally achieved, the synaptic weights are identical for both the system. 
 2.2 Multilayer Perceptron Learning rule 
 
At the beginning of the synchronization process multilayer perceptron of A and B start with 
uncorrelated weight vectors BAiw / . For each time step K, public input vectors are generated 
randomly and the corresponding output bits τ A/Bare calculated. Afterwards A and B communicate 
their output bits to each other. If they disagree, τ A ≠ τ B, the weights are not changed. Otherwise 
learning rules suitable for synchronization is applied. In the case of the Hebbian learning rule [10] 
both neural networks learn from each other. 
 
                                           
( ) ( )( )BAijiji xwgw ji τττστ ΘΘ+=+ ,,,                                                     (12) 
 
The learning rules used for synchronizing multilayer perceptron share a common structure. That 
is why they can be described by a single (eq. 4)  
 
                                        
( )( )jiBAiji xfwgw ji ,, ,,, ττσ+=+                                                        (13) 
 
with a function ( )BAif ττσ ,, , which can take the values -1, 0, or +1. In the case of bidirectional 
interaction it is given by 
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The common part ( ) ( )BAA ττστ ΘΘ  of ( )BAif ττσ ,,  controls, when the weight vector of a hidden  
unit is adjusted. Because it is responsible for the occurrence of attractive and repulsive steps [6]. 
  
The equation consists of two parts: 
 
1. ( ) ( )BAA ττστ ΘΘ : This part is common between the three learning rules and it is 
responsible for the attractive and repulsive effect and controls when the weight vectors of 
a hidden unit is updated. Therefore, all three learning rules have similar effect on the 
overlap. 
 
2.  (,−, 1) : This part differs among the three learning rules and it is responsible for the 
direction of the weights movement in the space. Therefore, it changes the distribution of 
the weights in the case of Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning. For the Hebbian rule, A’s 
ad B’s multilayer perceptron learn their own output and the weights are pushed towards 
the boundaries at − and +. In contrast, by using the anti- Hebbian rule, A’s and B’s 
multilayer perceptron learn the opposite of their own outputs. Consequently, the weights 
are pulled from the boundaries ±. The random walk rule is the only rule that does not 
affect the weight distribution so they stay uniformly distributed. In fact, at large values of 
	, both Hebbian and anti-Hebbian rules do not affect the weight distribution. Therefore, 
the proposed algorithm is restricted to use either random walk learning rule or Hebian or 
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anti-Hebbian learning rules only at large values of 	. The random walk learning rule is 
chosen since it does not affect the weights distribution 
            regardless of the value of 	. 
 
2.3 Weight Distribution of Multilayer Perceptron 
 
In case of the Hebbian rule (eq. 8), A's and B's multilayer perceptron learn their own output. 
Therefore the direction in which the weight jiw ,   moves is determined by the product jii x ,σ   . As 
the output iσ is a function of all input values, jix , and iσ are correlated random variables. Thus 
the probabilities to observe jii x ,σ = +1 or jii x ,σ = -1 are not equal, but depend on the value of the 
corresponding weight jiw , [11, 13, 14, 15, 16]. 
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According to this equation, )sgn( ,, jijii wx =σ  occurs more often than the opposite,
)sgn(
,, jijii wx −=σ . Consequently, the Hebbian learning rule pushes the weights towards 
the boundaries at -L and +L. In order to quantify this effect the stationary probability distribution 
of the weights for ∞→t is calculated for the transition probabilities. This leads to [11]. 
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Here the normalization constant 0ρ is given by 
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In the limit ∞→N the argument of the error functions vanishes, so that the weights stay 
uniformly distributed. In this case the initial length of the weight vectors is not changed by the 
process of synchronization. 
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But, for finite N, the probability distribution itself depends on the order parameter iQ Therefore its 
expectation value is given by the solution of the following equation:    
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2.4 Order Parameters  
 
In order to describe the correlations between two multilayer perceptron caused by the 
synchronization process, one can look at the probability distribution of the weight values in each 
hidden unit. It is given by (2L + 1) variables. 
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which are defined as the probability to find a weight with awAji =,  in A's multilayer perceptron and 
bwBji =,  in B's multilayer perceptron. In both cases, simulation and iterative calculation, the 
standard order parameters, which are also used for the analysis of online learning, can be 
calculated as functions of i
baP , [12]. 
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Then the level of synchronization is given by the normalized overlap between two corresponding 
hidden units 
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2.5  Hidden Layer as a Secret Session Key 
 
At end of full weight synchronization process, weight vectors between input layer and activated 
hidden layer of both multilayer perceptron systems become identical. Activated hidden layer’s 
output of source multilayer perceptron is used to construct the secret session key. This session 
key is not get transmitted over public channel because receiver multilayer perceptron has same 
identical activated hidden layer’s output. Compute the values of the each hidden unit by  
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For example consider 8 hidden units of activated hidden layer having absolute value (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 
1, 0, 1) becomes an 8 bit block. This 10010101 become a secret session key for a particular 
session and cascaded xored with recursive replacement encrypted text. Now final session key 
based encrypted text is transmitted to the receiver end. Receiver has the identical session key i.e. 
the output of the hidden units of activated hidden layer of receiver. This session key used to get 
the recursive replacement encrypted text from the final cipher text. In the next session both the 
machines started tuning again to produce another session key.  
 
Identical weight vector derived from synaptic link between input and activated hidden layer of 
both multilayer perceptron can also becomes secret session key for a particular session after full 
weight synchronization is achieved. 
 
3. KEY GENERATION AND CERTIFICATION IN KGCMLP 
 
The key organization procedure defines messages and data necessary for cryptographic keys 
organization with certification. Both receiver and sender use one multilayer perceptron with 
identical structure. The parameters k, l and n are public. For example if multilayer perceptron 
uses 3 hidden neurons in hidden layer and each hidden neurons has 32 inputs neurons and weights 
limit equal ±127, then total number of weight generation is 96. 8 binary bits are needed to 
represents each weight, where the MSB represents the signal:  
 
if
if
otherwise
MSB ,1=
                                     (26) 
 
and others 7 bits represents the absolute value of the weight. In the time of multilayer perceptron 
synchronizing process, a total of 768 bits (total number of weights is 96 and 8 bits are needed to 
represents each weight) i.e. 6 groups of 128 bits gets generated. Proposed KGCMLP protocol also 
crates some control frames, these frames are shown in figure 2. The table 1 shows the frames and 
their respective command codes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Frames of KGCMLP protocol (a) SYN, (b) FIN_SYN,                                                 
(c) ACK_SYN, NAK_ SYN and (d) AUTH. 
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Table 1.  KGCMLP Frames and their command codes. 
 
 
 
The process of KGCMLP protocol is divided in two phases: keys generation and certification. 
The key generation phase is shown in figure 3. It begins with the assignment of random values to 
weights. The input vector (X) is created by the sender at each step, through a seed of 128 bits. 
The sender uses the frame ACK_SYN to notify the receiver: seed value (S), its output ( senderτ ), 
an encrypted sequence of bits (Ek(ST)) and an identifier (ID). The encrypted sequence is obtained 
encrypting a variable known, called ST. This is necessary for the synchronization test. The 
identifier is the function of informing the sender and receiver where the message is a recent 
message. The variable ID starts with zero and is incremented every time that the sender sends a 
synchronization frame. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Exchange of messages between sender and receiver during key generation. 
 
After transmitting the frame SYN, the sender starts a timer and waits a reply from the receiver. If 
the receiver does not take action until a certain limit time and number of attempts has not 
exceeded a certain value, the sender restarts the synchronization procedure. When the receiver 
receives the frame SYN, the receiver should carry out integrity test. If the messages are received 
as sent (with no replication, incorporation, alteration, reordering, or replay) the receiver will 
execute the synchronization check. This check is accomplished through the following steps: 
receiver utilize its 128 first weights as key for decryption Ek(ST) that was received from the 
sender. If the result is identical to ST variable formerly stored in its memory, the networks are 
synchronized. Finally, the receiver should arbitrarily pick one of six positions of weights vector to 
form a key. Afterward, it should inform the sender who obtained the synchronization and which 
will be the IV (IndexVector) of weights that will be used to the generate key. The receiver should 
send the frame FIN_SYN to alert the sender. If decryption algorithm does not produce predictable 
result, the receiver should use the seed (S) in its pseudo-random number generator to produce the 
network inputs (X). With this input vector the receiver will work out its output ( receiverτ ). If 
network output is equal to sender output ( receiverτ = senderτ ) then receiver should regulate their 
weights. At the end of weights update, the receiver should report the sender that outputs are the 
equal. The receiver uses the frame ACK_SYN to notify the sender, with the same ID value 
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received from sender. If the receiver and sender outputs are different, the receiver should not fine-
tune its weights and inform the sender its output. The receiver sends the message NACK_SYN to 
notify the sender, with the same ID value. If sender receives ACK _SYN it should update its 
weights. The sender will create new synchronization frame until receive the frame FIN_ACK 
from receiver. When the sender receives the frame FIN_ACK, it must extract the keys of the 
neural network according to the Index Vector informed by the receiver. At the end of the 
synchronization, both networks provide the same key for encryption. However, only the process 
of generating keys does not guarantee the information security. Therefore, any attacker can also 
synchronize with an authorized device, because the protocol is a public knowledge. Thus, to 
ensure that only entities authorized have access to information is necessary authentication service. 
The function of the authentication service is to ensure the recipient that the message is from the 
source that it claims. There are several authentication methods, differentiated mainly by the use of 
secret-keys or public-keys. Unlike encryption algorithms, in public-key authentication the user A 
send message encrypted with A.’s private-key. The recipient of the message uses the public-key 
to verify the message, thus ensuring that only the owner of the private-key could have encrypted 
the message. On secret keys authentication both entities must have a common secret code. In this 
paper two secret codes are used, called RSC (Receiver Secret Code) and SSC (Sender Secret 
Code), as shown in the figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Exchange of messages during key certification.  
 
The key certification start with both multilayer perceptron synchronized. The sender will use the 
neural network weights as key to encrypt the variable SSC. The sender sends an authentication 
frame (AUTH) to receiver. If the receiver does not respond until a certain limit time, the sender 
increases the number of attempts. If this number does not exceed a threshold, the sender sends 
again the AUTH frame. Otherwise, sender terminates the authentication phase. The receiver 
should decrypt the key field when the AUTH frame is received. If the result is equal to receiver 
SSC, the tag learns that the synchronized device is authorized. After that, the receiver must be 
authenticated. For this, the receiver should use neural network weights to encrypt its RSC 
variable and send it to sender. The sender receives the AUTH frame, decrypt the key field and 
verify the RSC. If the received key is valid the receiver is certified, terminates the authentication 
phase. In data transmission phase, the sender can continue to generate random seeds, to feed the 
multilayer perceptron, and get different keys for each frame transmitted. 
  
4. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS  
 
The complexity of the Synchronization technique will be O(L), which can be computed using 
following three steps. 
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Step 1. To generate a MLP guided key of length N needs O(N) Computational steps. The 
average synchronization time is almost independent of the size N of the networks, at 
least up to N=1000.Asymptotically one expects an increase like O (log N).   
 
Step 2. Complexity of the encryption technique is O(L).      
               
Step 2. 1. Recursive replacement of bits using prime nonprime recognition encryption process 
takes O(L). 
 
Step 2. 2. MLP based encryption technique takes O(L) amount of time. 
 
Step 3.    Complexity of the decryption technique is O(L). 
 
Step 3. 1.  In MLP based decryption technique, complexity to convert final cipher text into 
recursive replacement cipher text T takes O(L). 
 
Step 3. 2.   Transformation of recursive replacement cipher text T into the corresponding stream 
of bits S = s0 s1 s2 s3 s4…sL-1, which is the source block takes O(L) as this step also 
takes constant amount of time for merging s0 s1 s2 s3 s4…sL-1.  
 
5.  EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
 
The average of synchronization times with respect to the variable l are shown in figure 5. In the 
graphic, we can observe that the increase in safety level (i.e., the increase in the variable l) 
implies in an exponential increase of iterations needed for synchronization. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Average of synchronization time as a function of l for k = 3 and n = 32, obtained 
in 1000 runs. 
  
While the parameter l influence directly in the safety level, the variable n determines the number 
of generated keys. Figure 6 shows the relationship between the average synchronization times as 
a function of n in 1000 samples. The graphic shown that the increase of n (i.e., larger number 
of generated keys) implies a small increase in the average time needed to obtain synchronization. 
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Figure 6. Average of time synchronization as a function of n for k = 3 and l = 5, found from 
1000 runs. 
 
In this section the results of implementation of the proposed KGCMLP encryption/decryption 
technique has been presented in terms of encryption decryption time, Chi-Square test, source file 
size vs. encryption time along with source file size vs. encrypted file size. The results are also 
compared with existing RSA [1] technique, existing ANNRBLC [8] and NNSKECC [9].   
.Table 2. Encryption / decryption time vs. File size 
 
Encryption Time (s) 
Decryption Time (s) 
Source 
Size 
(bytes) 
KGCMLP 
NNSKE
CC 
[9] 
Encryp
ted Size 
(bytes) 
KGCMLP 
NNSKE
CC 
[9] 
18432 6. 42 7.85 18432 6.99 7.81 
23044 9. 23 10.32 23040 9.27 9.92 
35425 14. 62 15.21 35425 14. 47 14.93 
36242 14. 72 15.34 36242 15. 19 15.24 
59398 25. 11 25.49 59398 24. 34 24.95 
 
Table 2 shows encryption and decryption time with respect to the source and encrypted size 
respectively. It is also observed the alternation of the size on encryption. 
 
In figure 7 stream size is represented along X axis and encryption / decryption time is represented 
along Y-axis. This graph is not linear, because of different time requirement for finding 
appropriate KGCMLP key. It is observed that the decryption time is almost linear, because there 
is no KGCMLP key generation process during decryption. 
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Figure 7. Encryption  decryption time against stream size 
 
Table 3 shows Chi-Square value for different source stream size after applying different 
encryption algorithms. It is seen that the Chi-Square value of KGCMLP is better compared to the 
algorithm ANNRBLC [8] and comparable to the Chi-Square value of the RSA algorithm.  
 
Table 3. Source size  vs. Chi-Square value 
 
 
 
Figure 8 shows graphical representation of table 3. 
 
 
Figure 8. Chi-Square value against stream size 
 
Table 4 shows total number of iteration  needed and number of data being transferred for 
KGCMLP key generation process with different numbers of input(N) and activated hidden(H) 
neurons and varying synaptic depth(L). 
  
Table 4. Data Exchanged and No. of Iterations For Different  Parameters Value 
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Following figure 9. Shows the snapshot of KGCMLP key simulation process.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. KGCMLP Key Simulation Snapshot with N=12, K=10 and L=6 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
From results obtained it is clear that the technique will achieve optimal performances. Encryption 
time and decryption time varies almost linearly with respect to the block size. For the algorithm 
presented, Chi-Square value is very high compared to some existing algorithms. A user input key 
has to transmit over the public channel all the way to the receiver for performing the decryption 
procedure. So there is a likelihood of attack at the time of key exchange. To defeat this insecure 
secret key generation technique a neural network based secret key generation technique has been 
devised. The security issue of existing algorithm can be improved by using KGCMLP secret 
session key generation technique. In this case, the two partners A and B do not have to share a 
common secret but use their indistinguishable weights or output of activated hidden layer as a 
secret key needed for encryption. The fundamental conception of KGCMLP based key exchange 
protocol focuses mostly on two key attributes of KGCMLP. Firstly, two nodes coupled over a 
public channel will synchronize even though each individual network exhibits disorganized 
behaviour. Secondly, an outside network, even if identical to the two communicating networks, 
will find it exceptionally difficult to synchronize with those parties, those parties are 
communicating over a public network. An attacker E who knows all the particulars of the 
algorithm and records through this channel finds it thorny to synchronize with the parties, and 
hence to calculate the common secret key. Synchronization by mutual learning (A and B) is much 
quicker than learning by listening (E) [10]. For usual cryptographic systems, we can improve the 
safety of the protocol by increasing of the key length. In the case of KGCMLP, we improved it by 
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increasing the synaptic depth L of the neural networks. For a brute force attack using K hidden 
neurons, K*N input neurons and boundary of weights L, gives (2L+1)KN possibilities. For 
example, the configuration K = 3, L = 3 and N = 100 gives us 3*10253 key possibilities, making 
the   attack unfeasible with today’s computer power. E could start from all of the (2L+1)3N initial 
weight vectors and calculate the ones which are consistent with the input/output sequence. It has 
been shown, that all of these initial states move towards the same final weight vector, the key is 
unique. This is not true for simple perceptron the most unbeaten cryptanalysis has two 
supplementary ingredients first; a group of attacker is used. Second, E makes extra training steps 
when A and B are quiet [10]-[12]. So increasing synaptic depth L of the KGCMLP we can make 
our KGCMLP safe.  
 
7. SECURITY ISSUE  
 
The main difference between the partners and the attacker in KGCMLP is that A and B are able 
to influence each other by communicating their output bits Aτ & Bτ  while E can only listen to 
these messages. Of course, A and B use their advantage to select suitable input vectors for 
adjusting the weights which finally leads to different synchronization times for partners and 
attackers. However, there are more effects, which show that the two-way communication between 
A and B makes attacking the KGCMLP protocol more difficult than simple learning of examples. 
These confirm that the security of KGCMLP key generation is based on the bidirectional 
interaction of the partners. Each partener uses a seperate, but identical pseudo random number 
generator. As these devices are initialized with a secret seed state shared by A and B. They 
produce exactly the same sequence of input bits.  Whereas attacker does not know this secret seed 
state. By increasing synaptic depth  average synchronize time will be increased by polynomial 
time. But success probability of attacker will be drop exponentially Synchonization by mutual 
learning is much faster than learning by adopting to example  generated by other network. 
Unidirectional learning and bidirectional synchronization. As E can’t influence A and B at the 
time they stop transmit due to synchrnization. Only one weight get changed where,     = T. So, 
difficult to find weight for attacker to know the actual weight without knowing internal 
representation it has to guess.  
8. FUTURE SCOPE & CONCLUSION  
 
This paper presented a novel approach for key generation and authentication using multilayer 
perceptron. KGCMLP algorithms is proposed as extensions to the ordinary mutual learning 
algorithm. This algorithm can be used in many applications such as video and voice conferences. 
This technique enhances the security features of the key exchange algorithm by increasing of the 
synaptic depth L of the KGCMLP. Here two partners A and B do not have to exchange a common 
secret key over a public channel but use their indistinguishable weights or outputs of the activated 
hidden layer as a secret key needed for encryption or decryption. So likelihood of attack proposed 
technique is much lesser than the simple key exchange algorithm.  
 
Future scope of this technique is that this KGCMLP model can be used in wireless 
communication and also in key distribution mechanism.  
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